العنوان
NA
Abstract
This research paper attempts to examine the underlying paradox when using insurance as an instrument of transferring the banking fraud risk along with the introduction of new and complicated operational risks that have often been neglected in academic discussion. A mixed method research design is utilized, which combines quantitative analysis of 320 operational losses, 24 insurance policies and 72 valid questionnaires (from 80 distributed) along with the qualitative analysis based on 25 semi-structured interviews with risk managers, claims officers and legal advisors. The major findings of the research consist of the three-category differentiation of operational risks related to insurance – namely pre-contracting risks, contracting stage risks, and post-loss risks. In addition, the empirical evidence proves that there is the presence of the problem of moral hazard, represented by lower fraud reporting in case of using insurance. Finally, the semi-structured interview results reveal an important expectation gap and reputational risks caused by insurance problems. Two novel theoretical constructs, ``Insurance Operational Risk Cycle'' model and ``Triadic Governance Model,'' have been developed. They link the studies devoted to operational risk, insurance, and financial crimes. These models could be used as an analytical tool to develop new approaches to managing such operational risks.
Article Language
English
Recommended Citation
Majeed, Manal Hameed
(2026)
"Operational Risks of Insurance against Banking Fraud,"
AUIQ Humanities and Social Sciences: Vol. 2:
Iss.
2, Article 2.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.70176/3106-7557.1017
Available at:
https://ahss.alayen.edu.iq/journal/vol2/iss2/2
